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With privacy enhancing identity management, end users are given better ways for
managing their identities for specific contexts. One could easily argue that the need to
implement identity management systems that are privacy enhancing follows from the
EU data protection regulation. One of the challenges while developing privacy enhancing
identity management is getting governments to become genuinely interested, both in their
capacity of data processing organisation and legislator or policy maker. Another challenge,
this time for the private sector, is to find the right balance between data protection perfec-
tion and simplicity or users’ convenience, while developing privacy enhancing identity
management systems. After a brief discussion of these challenges we discuss the growing
human rights recognition of the value of digital identity and its management. In particular,
the German constitutional court seems to pave the way for a basic right to have digital
identity protected and secured.
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Identity management (IDM) is commonly referred to as the
set of processes and tools that serve to establish the identity of
a user (e.g. enrol an employee, customer, contractor) in
a system.1 Today a trend towards user-centricity and privacy
enhancing identity management is noticeable,2 with the EU
funding research initiatives such as Prime enabling more
user control.3 User-centricity distinguishes itself from otheraper presented at NATO Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) on
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the user) – and not some authority – maintains control over
‘‘what, where, when, and to whom’’ a user’s identity informa-
tion is released.4 The researchers gathered in Prime to develop
identity management systems that give individuals sover-
eignty over their personal data so that: (1) individuals can limit
the information collected about them by using pseudo-
identities, certifications and cryptography when performing
online transactions; (2). individuals can negotiate legally
binding ‘‘privacy policies’’ with their service providers which
govern how disclosed personal data can be used and which
precautions must be taken to safeguard it, and (3) individuals
and service providers can use automated mechanisms to
manage their personal data and their obligations towards
data which they have collected from other parties.5
The proposed system includes an anonymous credential
system, an access control system based on a novel paradigm,
a negotiation functionality, and an automated reasoning
system. ‘‘This machinery performs most of the decision
making involved in privacy management and involves the
user mainly for making final high-level decisions and for
giving consent to data processing. Together, these compo-
nents give a user the power to easily manage her privacy
without being an expert in the field’’.62. The legal framework
With privacy enhancing identity management, end users are
given better ways for managing their identities for specific
contexts. One could easily argue that the need to implement
identity management systems that are privacy enhancing
follows from the EU data protection regulation, in particular
EU Directives 95/46/EC and 2002/58/EC (whose purposes are
to safeguard individuals’ privacy and freedom) and from the
EU 2000 Charter on Fundamental Rights. These sets of regula-
tions impose a number of important principles:
(1) the purpose limitation principle – data should be processed
for a specific purpose and subsequently used or further
communicated only insofar as this is not incompatible
with the purpose of the transfer;
(2) the data quality and proportionality principle – data should
be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. The
data should be adequate, relevant and not excessive in
relation to the purposes for which they are transferred or
further processed;
(3) the transparency principle – individuals should be
provided with information as to the purpose of the pro-
cessing and the identity of the data controller in the third
country, and other information insofar as this is necessary
to ensure fairness;4 Mary Rundle and others, ‘At a Crossroads: ‘‘Personhood’’ and
Digital Identity in the Information Society’, STI Working Paper
2007/7, OECD, February 2008 (52p.), p. 22 (http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/31/6/40204773.doc).
5 Jan Camenisch and others, ‘Privacy and identity management
for everyone’, ACM, 2005, p. 20.
6 Jan Camenisch and others, ‘Privacy and identity management
for everyone’, ACM, 2005, p. 20.(4) the security principle – technical and organisational secu-
rity measures should be taken by the data controller that
are appropriate to the risks presented by the processing.
Any person acting under the authority of the data
controller, including a processor, must not process data
except on instructions from the controller;
(5) the rights of access, rectification and opposition – the data
subject should have a right to obtain a copy of all data
relating to him/her that are processed, and a right to recti-
fication of those data where they are shown to be inaccu-
rate. In certain situations he/she should also be able to
object to the processing of the data relating to him/her.
There is no question about the ability of identity manage-
ment systems to support the realisation of data protection
rights and goals geared towards giving a person notice,
consent, security, and access with respect to his personal
data. In identity management systems it is, for example, tech-
nically possible for parties to provide the type of notice and
negotiate the kind of consent envisioned in the principle of
purpose limitation. Similarly, identity management systems
can include mechanisms to provide users with security as
spelled out in the principles of security and to enable a person
to know how data is treated and contest that treatment, as
foreseen by the principles of rights of access, rectification
and opposition.73. Problems with privacy enhancing identity
management: public sector
One of the challenges while developing privacy enhancing
identity management is getting governments to become
genuinely interested, both in their capacity of data pro-
cessing organisation and legislator or policy maker. Govern-
ments have traditionally had a central role in providing for
the identity of citizens through the issuance of documents
such as birth and death certificates, passports, social secu-
rity numbers or driving licences. Today they need to be con-
cerned over respect for privacy, data protection and security
and respond to challenges posed by digital identity manage-
ment by setting up frameworks that are beneficial to user
control over e-Identity aspects. The OECD has elaborated
guidelines to improve a culture of security between all the
stakeholders involved in the exchange of information and
to encourage sound security practices.8 The EU launched
a Safer Internet Action Plan,9 and both at the level of the
Council of Europe and at the level of the EU measures
were adopted obliging Member States to incriminate certain
crimes related to digital identity and to collaborate in cases7 Mary Rundle and others, ‘At a Crossroads’, p. 33. Mary Rundle
and others, ‘At a Crossroads’, p. 28–32.
8 OECD, OECD Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and
Networks: Towards a Culture of Security (adopted as a Recommenda-
tion of the OECD Council at its 1037th Session on 25 July 2002),
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Privacy and Electronic Communications requires that loca-
tion information generated by mobile phones can only be
further used or passed on by network operators with prior
user consent, unless it is an emergency call. In a recent
report commissioned by the OECD examples are forwarded
of user-centric and privacy enhancing approaches to
national identity card schemes.11 In the future the Belgium
e-Identity card will allow persons to prove that they are
older than 18 without being required or forced to make
public other data.12
A 2003 European report showed with regard to identity
theft in Europe that, due to strong existing European legisla-
tion, which defines clear privacy and data protection rights,
this type of crime is less frequent than in other countries.13
Clearly, our policy makers are not absent. However, some
governments are setting up very simple, centralised identity
management systems using unique identifiers ignoring risks
and security risks.14 Currently all European Member States
are setting up centralised or semi-centralised fingerprint
databases of citizens, largely ignoring the sloppy, insecure
use of fingerprint biometrics in the private sector.15 In June
2007 Dutch scientists have discovered that a certain type of
smartcard, Mifare, which is used to gain access to government
departments, schools and hospitals around Britain, is carrying
a serious security flaw that allows it to be easily copied.16
Earlier this year a major smartcard system with similar goals
in the Netherlands was easily compromised by the same
investigators.17
The government is also responsible for national security
and criminal law enforcement. The law acknowledges this10 P. De Hert, G. González Fuster & E.-J. Koops, ‘Fighting cyber-
crime in the two Europes: the added value of the EU Framework
Decision and the Council of Europe Convention’, International
Review of Penal Law, vol. 77, 2006, No. 3–4, 503–524.
11 Mary Rundle and others, ‘At a Crossroads’, p. 36.
12 See ‘Algemeen EID Officieel antwoord van KUL onderzoeks-
groep op artikel en studie Persbericht – De Elektronische Identi-
teitskaart is Veilig’, COSIC, K.U. Leuven, 13 June 2008 (http://
belsec.skynetblogs.be/post/5966749/eid-officieel-antwoord-van-
kul-onderzoeksgroe).
13 B. Clements, I. Maghiros, L. Beslay, C. Centeno, Y. Punie, C.
Rodrı̈guez & M. Masera (eds.), Security and Privacy for the Citizen
in the Post-September 11 Digital Age. A prospective overview, Report
to the European Parliament Committee on Citizens’ Freedoms
and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), July 2003, Brussels,
European Commission, IPTS-Technical Report Series, EUR 20823
EN, 188p. (http://ftp.jrc.es/EURdoc/eur20823en.pdf).
14 A. Carblanc, ‘Digitial identity and its management in
e-society’, p. 3.
15 P. De Hert, ‘Legal Aspects of Biometric Technologies’, in
Institute For Prospective Technological Studies – Joint
Research Centre, Biometrics at the Frontiers: Assessing the Impact
on Society, Report to the European Parliament Committee on
Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs
(LIBE), February 2005, IPTS-Technical Report Series, EUR
21585 EN, p. 75–85.
16 Miller, Vikki, ‘‘Oyster card: fears over Mifare security’’, The Tele-
graph, 21 June 2008. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/
politics/2168791/Oyster-card-fears-over-Mifare-security.html.
17 ‘OV-chip 2.0. Dutch develop open source smart card for public
transport’, Amsterdam, June 19, 2008, http://www.nlnet.nl/press/
20080619-ovcard.html.and allows, for example, use of data without consent for these
purposes.18
However, on response to the threat of terrorism after the
tragedy of September 11, many governments enhanced their
surveillance powers, voting laws that were heavily criticised
from a privacy perspective. The EU seemingly takes part in
the global tendency towards ambient intelligence security
enforcement scenarios, relying on the massive collection
and processing of (personal and non personal) data in combi-
nation with data mining and profiling techniques. This
tendency highlights the fragility of data protection law as
a tool to control surveillance. Lawful collection and processing
of personal data does not prevent per se unethical practices
deployed in the name of security, or unjust decisions based
on them. Arguably, the alleged need ‘to mobilize information
to prevent terrorism’19 and equivalent instructions frontally
contradict fundamental principles of data protection law
(such as the minimisation principle) and the requirements
for privacy enhancing identity management.20 A general
framework to limit surveillance needs to be designed, in
which the enabling force of data protection regulation is com-
plemented with more clearly defined restrictive principles.4. Problems with privacy enhancing identity
management: private sector
Turning to the private sector we see a major challenge in
finding the right balance between data protection perfection
and simplicity or users’ convenience, while developing
privacy enhancing identity management systems. Without
this balance users will consent to schemes that are simple
but erode privacy concerns.
In a 2008 OECD report these and other risks are amply
identified.21 The report insists on the following technical qual-
ities that users are implicitly demanding for the privacy
aspects of user control: decentralisation (maximal decentral-
isation of identity information into as many separate data
contexts as possible); data minimisation and selective disclo-
sure; use of local identifiers (avoid using more global identi-
fiers such as a government tax identity number); verifiability
(the system must support mechanisms for verification of
claims), and composability. Even more important in the report
is the suggestion to rewrite five data protection principles18 Article 13 of the EU 1995 Directive contains exceptions with
regard to the purpose limitation principle, the transparency prin-
ciple and the principle of access.
19 See, for instance: Markle Foundation Task Force (2006), Mobi-
lizing Information to Prevent Terrorism: Accelerating Development of
a Trusted Information Sharing Environment, Third Report, July.
20 F. González Fuster, S. Gutwirth & P. De Hert, ‘The Role of Law,
Ethics and Justice in Security Practices’ in J. Peter Burgess & David
Rodin (eds.), The Role of Law, Ethics and Justice in Security Practices
Conference report, Oslo, International Peace Research Institute
(PRIO), 2008 (69p.), 22–24 (http://www.prio.no). On the risk of
destruction of personhood, see Mary Rundle and others, ‘At
a Crossroads’, p. 21.
21 Mary Rundle and others, ‘At a Crossroads: ‘‘Personhood’’ and
Digital Identity in the Information Society’, STI Working Paper
2007/7, OECD, February 2008, 52p (http://www.oecd.org/data-
oecd/31/6/40204773.doc).
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privacy enhancing identity management systems based on
user control.22 Complementing existing formulation of data
protection principles is needed. These principles ‘have a strong
focus on protecting a person’s data against inappropriate
treatment by other actors; however, they place the individual
in a rather passive role and so fail to provide him with the
proactive right to use his own identity information as he
sees fit. The law may need to lend its support to emergent
IDM tools so that the user will by default have a right to
make use of his personal data’ (p. 28). These and other recom-
mendations to adapt the existing legal framework will not only
benefit the end user, but equally governments that have a duty
to respect fundamental rights and producers that need to be
aware of the existing legal framework. At the present stage
there are too few indications about business’ readiness to
come up with services or processes that live up to higher
data protection concerns.23 The importance of consent in
user-centricity is beyond doubt but it is only one necessary
ingredient of privacy-enhancing identity management.
Currently many organisations believe that they own the
personal information of their clients. A change in business
thinking and culture is needed towards a business model in
which the individual is perceived as the ultimate owner of
their own information.24 The current data protection22 Mary Rundle and others, ‘At a Crossroads’, p. 28–32.
23 See for example, The European e-Business report 2006–07
(www.ebusiness-watch.org/key_reports/documents/EBR06.pdf).
In this document privacy is mentioned only twice and data
protection only once.
24 ‘‘At present, most organisations view every client contact as
an opportunity to begin building an ongoing relationship with
the client. This relationship may lead to more opportunities to
do business with the client or to build client satisfaction and
loyalty. Consequently, the company seeks to gather information
from an individual the first time he requests a service, with
a view to building an ongoing relationship. This orientation
may lead a company to gather information that is not strictly
required for the transaction, and it may prevent the company
from deleting information once the transaction is completed. A
shift would not mean that organisations could not build client
relationships; it would just mean that they would have to do so
through explicit relationship-building transactions to which the
individual would consent. Organisations must come to see that
the personal information of their clients is not only an asset,
but also a potential liability, e.g. a source of law suits over the
failure adequately to protect such data, particularly in the
absence of a client driven/consented reason for having it. As
regulatory controls over personal information increase, the
amount of liability associated with data collection will also force
companies to re-evaluate their data gathering and retention
requirements. Despite the human tendency to want to know
the identity of the individual being served, for many situations
this may not be necessary and may not be desired by the
individual. To process transactions with little or no identifying
information will often mean reliance on a third party assertion
or assurance on behalf of the individual. This will require an
enterprise not only to be confident in the technical trust assur-
ances (e.g. digital certificates) provided, but also to develop new
business and operational relationships with those third parties.
This may include regular assurances/audits of third parties and
co-operation in trouble-shooting and investigations’’ (Mary
Rundle and others, ‘At a Crossroads’, p. 24).framework is not of a nature to oblige the business commu-
nity to seek for best data protection standards, as long as
the processing of data is based on consent. The active duty
to explore emerging concepts for IDM such as user-centricity
and user-control cannot be enforced in an unequivocal way.
Data protection regulation does not prohibit, as such, organi-
sation-centric business models. Even the recent recognised
‘fundamental right to data protection’ in the EU Charter on
Fundamental Rights25 does not explicitly infer a duty to
develop user controlled identity management systems to
protect better data protection aspects of e-Identity.5. A fundamental right to the confidentiality
and integrity of information systems
The future identity infrastructure will not be simple. In a world
of ‘‘Internet of things’’, computing will ‘‘melt invisibly into the
fabric of our business, personal and social environments, sup-
porting our economic, health, community and private life.’’26
More data will be generated and the management of it will
become unthinkable without a proper legal and technological
infrastructure. Carblanc advocates a holistic approach and
stresses the need to involve all stakeholders when elaborating
a framework and guiding principles.27 Without denying the
business interests in reducing costs and enhancing user
convenience and governmental interests in law enforcement
and fraud detection, it is useful to end with an observation
about the growing human rights recognition of the value of
digital identity and its management. In particular, the German
constitutional court seems to pave the way for a basic right to
have digital identity protected and secured. On 15 December
1983, in the Volkszählungsurteil28 the Court recognised a right
to self-determination based on the allgemeines Persönlichkeits-
recht, as protected by Article 1 (Human Dignity) in conjunction
with Article 2 (Right of Liberty) of the German Constitution.
The Court related that the individual needs ‘‘be protected
from unlimited collection, storage, use, and transmission of
personal data as a condition of the development of his or25 Cf. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of
the European Parliament, December 7, 2000, O.J., No. C 364,
2000, p. 1 and fol. In this Charter, a separate right to data protec-
tion is recognised next to the right to a private life for the indi-
vidual. Article 7 of the Charter recognises a right to privacy.
Article 8 of the Charter focuses on the protection of personal
data: ‘Everyone has the right to the protection of their personal
data. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes
and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or
some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the
right of access to their data, and the right to have it rectified.
Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an
independent authority’ (Article 8 EU Charter).
26 John Backley, Policy framework paper presented at work-
shop ‘‘From RFID to the Internet of things’’, 6 and 7 March
2006, CCAB, Brussels, final report. Available at http://www.
rfidconsultation.eu/docs/ficheiros/WS_1_Final_report_27_Mar.
pdf.
27 A. Carblanc, ‘Digitial identity and its management in
e-society’, p. 6.
28 BVerfGE 65 E 40.
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cessing’’. With unequalled precision, the Court of Karlsruhe
explained in detail the shift of power that takes place when-
ever the state or private actors interact with an individual
through ICTs. The Constitutional Court reasoned that a per-
son’s knowledge that his or her actions are being watched
inevitably curtails his or her freedom to act.
As recently as 27 February 2008, the German Constitu-
tional Court gave a ruling about the constitutionality of
secret online searches of computers by government
agencies.29 It considered those searches to be contrary to
a newly recognised basic right, namely ‘‘the right to confi-
dentiality and integrity of information systems’’ which
complements the 1983 ‘‘fundamental right to informational
self-determination’’ (see above). The court pondered that
informational–technical systems, including laptops, PDAs
and mobile phones ‘alone or in their technical intercon-
nectness [.] makes it possible to get insight into relevant
parts of the conduct of the life of a person or even gather29 Published on 27 February 2008 (OnlineDurchsuchung, 1 BvR 370/
07; 1 BvR 595/07).a meaningful picture of the personality’. This affects the
right to self-determination of the individual who might
refrain, for instance, from opening a web-blog or dissemi-
nate emails.
The Court limits exceptions to the right to specific cases
where exist ‘‘factual indications for a concrete danger’’ for
the life, body and freedom of persons or for the foundations
of the state or the existence of human beings, and declares
that state spying measures can only be implemented after
approval by a judge. Moreover, secret online searches must
in any case be constrained by ad hoc technical measures
not to interfere with ‘‘the core area of the conduct of private
life’’. This landmark ruling, that recognises a citizen’s right
to the integrity of their information-technology systems
and introduces elements of user-centric identity manage-
ment (safeguards against (subsequent) misuse through tech-
nology and the intervention of judges), can potentially be as
influential as the 1983 recognition by the same Court of the
‘‘right to informational self-determination’’.
